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REDUCTIONIST REGULATORY REFORM
Lisa Heinzerling*
With the American wilderness disappearing before our eyes, it
is easy to forget that the chainsaw and the bulldozer are not the
only threats our natural resources face. Wildlife, plants, indeed
entire ecosystems must also contend with pollution. The effects
of pollution on natural resources can be severe. Acid precipitation produced by the long-range transport of sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxides has hurt forests, lakes, and streams.' Hormonedisrupting chemicals such as dioxin and DDT have been associated with widespread reproductive and other problems in birds,
4
fish, and mammals. 2 Pesticides 3 and ozone-depleting chemicals
have been implicated in the alarming decline of the world's
frogs. These and other ecological consequences quite obviously
have more than one cause, but it seems safe to say that pollution
is among them.

* Visiting Professor, Yale Law School (Fall 1997); Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Gerry Spann for
helpful discussion, and to Jo-Ellyn Sakowitz Klein and John Ritsick for
meticulous research assistance.
1. For a concise history of the scientific studies linking sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides with damage to water bodies and forests, see
John Harte, Acid Rain, in THE ENERGY-ENVIRONMENT CONNECTION 50
(Jack M.'Hollander ed., 1992).
2. See Theo Colborn et al., Developmental Effects of EndocrineDisrupting Chemicals in Wildlife and Humans, 101 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPEC-

378, 378-79 (Oct. 1993). These effects are discussed at length in
(1996).
3. For a discussion of research linking severe deformities in frogs
in the Midwest and Canada in part to pesticides, see Tom Meersman,
Frog Research Puts Spotlight on Pesticides, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St.Paul),
TIVES

THEO COLBORN ET AL., OUR STOLEN FUTURE

Feb. 16, 1997, at Al.

4. For the initial study finding an association between declining
amphibian populations and increased UV-B radiation (itself attributable to ozone depletion caused by pollution), see A.R. Blaustein et al.,
UV Repair and Resistance to Solar UV-B in Amphibian Eggs: A Link to Population Declines?, 91 PRoc. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. 1791 (Mar. 1, 1994). For criticism of this study based on its use of laboratory conditions rather than
in situ testing, see Wade Roush, When Rigor Meets Reality, 269 Sci. 313
(July 21, 1995).
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In recognition of these dangers, the express purpose of the
laws regulating pollution in this country is the protection of
human health and natural resources. Indeed, "protection of
human health and the environment" appears like a mantra in
virtually every one of our environmental laws.5 This statement of
purposes recognizes that pollution harms not only people, but
6
also other living things.
This regulatory system is under attack. Critics have charged
that the costs of many environmental regulations exceed their
benefits; that many regulations are cost-ineffective, or that there
are cheaper ways of achieving the same goals; that regulation
sometimes creates risks; and that government does not engage in
any sensible priority-setting.7 Each of these critiques has led to a
prominent proposal for regulatory reform. Arguments that costs
too often outweigh benefits and that current regulation is cost-

5. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-09,7602(h) (1996) (national
ambient air quality standards to be set at level adequate to protect public health and welfare; "welfare" defined to include natural resources);
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2) (A) (1997) (states' water quality standards must protect public health or welfare, and must take into
account waters' "use and value for public water supplies, propagation
of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural,, industrial,
and other purposes"); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Liability, and Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (1) (1997) (hazardous
waste sites to be cleaned to level sufficient to assure "protection of
human health and the environment"); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(a), 136(bb) (1997) (pesticide registration may be denied or limited if necessary to prevent "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment," defined to include "any unreasonable risk to man or the environment"); Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1996) (purpose is to protect
human health and the environment); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2601(a) (1995) (purpose is to protect human health and the
environment).
6. For a persuasive argument that the Environmental Protection
Agency should make better use of pollution control laws to protect biological diversity, or "those environmental goals that reach beyond
human health concerns," see Robert L. Fischman, Biological Diversity
and Environmental Protection: Authorities to Reduce Risk, 22 ENVTL. L.435,
437 (1992).
7. For a lucid account of these critiques, see STEPHEN BREYER,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION

(1993).
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ineffective have led, naturally enough, to calls for increased reliance on cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis. Claims that
regulation increases risks have supported demands for greater attention to risk tradeoffs. Complaints about the lack of prioritysetting have led to calls for increased use of comparative risk assessment. 8 These critiques and their corresponding reforms, long
discussed in the academic literature, have recently arrived in political circles, most famously in the legislation accompanying the
Contract With America.9
Despite their superficial differences, these critiques and their
corresponding reforms share an important feature: they proceed
as if the sole goal of environmental law were to protect human
health. Critiques of the current regulatory system have made it
appear outlandish and counterproductive partly by assuming that
it has no purpose other than preventing premature human
death. And, if the analysis required by the proposed reforms is to
be kept to a manageable shape and size, then these reforms
must embody the same reductionism.
In Part I of this essay, I review the reductionist tendencies of
current critiques of environmental law. I then sketch how the
proposals for regulatory reform that have followed from these
critiques are also, in practice, likely to reflect a one-dimensional
view of the purposes of environmental law. I conclude by describing how this reductionism will likely undermine the express and
sensible purpose of virtually all of our environmental laws, which
is to protect both humans and the other living things around us.
I. REDUCTIONIST CRITIQUES
The literature critical of existing environmental regulation is
nearly as vast as the regulation itself, and I will not attempt to
capture all of the details and nuances of the debate here. Certainly there are critiques that recognize that one important purpose of environmental law is to protect natural resources. Nevertheless, a substantial portion of the critical literature on
8. For a general discussion, see W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1423, 1436-55 (1996).
9. See Zygmunt Plater, Environmental Law as a Mirror of the Future:
Civic Values Confronting Market Force Dynamics in a Time of Counterrevolution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. Alw. L. REv. 733, 735 (1996) (cataloguing re-

forms proposed in the first 100 days of the 104th Congress).
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environmental regulation rests on an assumption that the only
goal of such regulation is to prevent premature human death.
This reductionism is evidenced in part by silence. One of the
most famous and influential critiques of current regulation, Justice Breyer's book, Breaking the Vicious Circle,'0 contains scarcely a
single reference to a living thing other than a human.11 The message is that such things are irrelevant.
This reductionism is perhaps best exemplified, however, by the
positive evidence gathered in support of current critiques. Particularly striking is the ubiquitous use of a table of figures, compiled by an economist at the Office of Management and Budget
named John Morrall, comparing the cost per human life saved of
various federal regulations. According to Morrall's figures, this
cost varies dramatically from regulation to regulation, from a low
of $100,000 per life saved, to a high of $72 billion. One-third of
the regulations on Morrall's list reportedly cost over $100 million
2
for every life they save.'
Morrall's table has been offered in support of each of the critiques of current regulation that I have mentioned. It has been relied on to argue that the costs of many environmental regulations exceed their benefits; 3 that many regulations are costineffective, or that there are cheaper ways of saving human
lives;' 4 that expensive regulations endanger human lives by their
very expensiveness; 5 and that government does not set priorities
in a rational manner.1 6 Indeed, it is rather rare to find an article

10. See supra note 7.
11. See Lisa Heinzerling, PoliticalScience, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 449, 463
(1995) (discussing BREYER, supra note 7).
12. See John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, REG. 25, 30 tbl.4
(Nov./Dec. 1986). For a critique of Morrall's figures, see Lisa
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Pmportions, 107 YALE LJ. (Forthcoming 1998) (finding that agencies' implicit estimates of the costs per
life saved of the rules on Morrall's list are as much as 1000 times lower
than the costs reported by Morrall, and that Morrall's high costs are
largely due to his decisions to discount future lives saved and to decrease the agencies' estimates of risk).
13. See Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, supra note 8, at 1430-36.
14. See BREYER, supra note 7, at 22.
15. See Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, supra note 8, at 1451-55.
16. See Cass R Sunstein, Legislative Foreword: Congress, Constitutional

1997]

REDUCTIONIST REGULATORY REFORM

critiquing risk regulation that does not at least refer to Morrall's
"widely circulated table,"17 if not reproduce it in full.18
Among other things, the all-purpose support provided by Morrall's table shows the close kinship among the different critiques
and their corresponding reforms. Advocates of better analysis of
cost-effectiveness, risk tradeoffs, and comparative risks have offered their reforms in part as an alternative to the (controversial) option of cost-benefit analysis. 19 On close inspection, however, all these reforms begin to look quite a lot alike. 20 The
common reliance on Morrall's figures is telling in this regard.
Most important for present purposes, the pervasive reliance on
estimates of the costs per human life saved of federal regulations
is concrete evidence of the reductionist leanings of these criti-

Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247, 257-60 (1996).
17. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulatory Reform: Where Are We Going?,
31 WAK FOREST L. REV. 581, 582 (1996).
18. Sources relying on Morrall's table include the following:
BREYER, supra note 7, at 24-27 tbl.5; W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONS[BIIJTIES FOR RISK 264 tbl.14-5 (1992); Randall Lutter & John E Morrall III, Health-Health Analysis: A New Way to
Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, in THE MORTALrIY COSTS OF REGULATORY EXPENDITURES 59 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 1994); Cass R. Sunstein,
Changing Images of the State: Well-Being and the State, 107 HARv. L. REV.
1303, 1318 tbl.8 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New
Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 451 n.133 (1987); W. Kip Viscusi, Equivalent
Frames of Reference for Judging Risk Regulation Policies, 3 N.Y.U. ENrL. Lj.
431, 450-52 tbl.2 (1994); W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort
Liability: Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to
Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 88-89 (1989).
19. See, e.g., Stephen E Williams, The Era of "Risk-Risk" and the Problem of Keeping the APA Up to Date, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1375, 1378 (1996)
("Whatever the explanation for the hostility to cost-benefit analysis,....
it seems irrefutable that general utilitarian tradeoffs encounter greater
resistance than does the balancing of pure health-health risks.").
20. For an argument that each of these basic reforms "may be deduced from a general more good than harm principle," and indeed
from " 'well-recognized' principles of rational decision making," see
Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant, "More Good Than Harm". A
First Principlefor EnvironmentalAgencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOLOGy
LQ. 379, 418 (1993) (quoting NATIONAL AcADEMY oF SCIENCES, COMMITTEE ON ENVmONMENTAL DECISION MAKING, 2 DECISION MAKING IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECION AGENCY

25-26 (1977)).
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ques. These estimates expressly exclude any consideration other
than saving human lives in judging the wisdom of regulation. It
thus should come as no surprise that a major conclusion of Morrail's original paper describing the costs per life saved of various
regulations was that safety regulations were more cost-effective
than health regulations. 2' Safety regulations, by definition, protect only human lives. Regulation of cars' steering columns, unvented space heaters, airplanes' fire safety devices, and children's
sleepwear, to name a few examples from Morrall's table, help
only humans.22 Their full benefits are thus captured by an assessment of their costs per human life saved. The same cannot be
said of health regulations pertaining to, for example, the production and use of chemicals and the disposal of hazardous wastes.3
An estimate of the costs per human life saved of the latter regulations will not capture the full benefits of these rules: benefits
which will range beyond human health to include ecological
consequences. Thus reductionist critiques tend to understate the
benefits and cost-effectiveness of the current regulatory system,
and to overstate its perverse results and lack of a rational
agenda.
Other scholars have noted a different kind of reductionism in
this fixation on the number of people whom regulation saves
from premature death. Human beings, they have stressed, care
about more than the timing of their own deaths. They also care
about how death comes about, including whether it is the result
of voluntary or involuntary processes, whether the risk of death
is equitably or inequitably distributed, and whether the mechanism of death poses a risk to future generations. 24 These non21. See Morrall, supra note 12, at 32-33.
22. Such regulations appear at the top of Morrall's chart, which
lists regulations in declining order of cost-effectiveness. Id. at 30 tbl.4.
23. Such regulations appear at the bottom of Morrall's chart. Id.
24. For a classic discussion of the research showing a divergence
in lay and expert perceptions of risk, which has spawned a huge body
of writing in law, political science, and cognitive psychology, see Paul
Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Sci. 280 (1987). For important accounts of
the legal implications of this divergence, see Clayton P. Gillette &
James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027 (1990);
Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique
of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562 (1992).
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statistical features of risk, now familiar to any student of risk and
its regulation, figure importantly in the public's perceptions of
risk. Yet they are ignored if the sole measure of regulatory success is the prevention of premature death. There appears to be a
developing consensus that these features of risk are relevant to
regulatory decisionmaking.2 Thus, I do not mean to suggest that
reductionism in all its forms has gone unnoticed and unaddressed in the debate on regulatory performance. But even the
attention to the nonstatistical features of risk takes human beings
to be its sole concern.
II.

REDUCTIONIST REFORMS

Given the reductionist leanings of current critiques of the regulatory system, it is not surprising that the proposals for reform
that have grown out of these critiques exhibit the same reductionist impulses. I address each of the major proposals in turn.
A.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

From the beginning, the major environmental statutes in this
country have been criticized for paying insufficient attention to
costs.2 Several of our most important environmental laws have,

in fact, been interpreted to forbid the consideration of costs in
the establishment of environmental standards.27 In order to en25. See John D. Graham, The Risk Not Reduced, 3 N.Y.U. ENvrL LJ.
382, 393 (1994). For a sustained defense of the consideration of nonstatistical features of risk in risk regulation, see Richard H. Pildes &
Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CmI. L. REv. 1, 3664 (1995).
26. For an early criticism of the Clean Air Act on this score, see
James Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro- and

Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REv. 323 (1974).
27. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (once a
federal action is found to jeopardize an endangered species in violation of the Endangered Species Act, courts may not balance costs and
benefits in deciding whether to enjoin the federal action); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(EPA may not consider costs in determining level of acceptable risk for
hazardous air pollutants under Clean Air Act); Lead Industries Ass'n,
Inc. v. EPA, 647 F2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (EPA may not consider costs
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sure a favorable balance between costs and benefits, recent proposals for regulatory reform have advocated increased reliance
on cost-benefit analysis.2 8 For example, one provision of the legislative package accompanying the Contract With America would
have required that all major federal regulations pass a cost-benefit test. 29
In theory, cost-benefit analysis does not require that the goals
of environmental law be reduced to one dimension: that of protecting human health. In practice, however, manageable costbenefit analysis will almost certainly involve this kind of reductionism, for the basic reason that the methods used to quantify
damages to natural resources are at present so immature. This
immaturity is true both of methods used to estimate risk to natural resources, and of methods used to value the estimated risk.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has only recently
issued guidelines for ecological risk assessment, 0 and some of
the most basic methodological questions remain unresolved. 31 Of
particular importance is the fact that current methods for ecological risk assessment operate site-specifically; for example, they
help determine the risk of ecological harm caused by the application of pesticide on a particular field.3 2 They have not, thus
in setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards under Clean Air
Act); Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (EPA may not
consider costs in setting effluent limits for toxic water pollutants under
Clean Water Act).
28. Despite the prohibition on the consideration of costs in many
environmental statutes, many studies, using conventional cost-benefit
analysis, have concluded that the overall benefits of environmental requirements overwhelm their overall costs. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990,
Draft Report to Congress ES-11 (Apr. 1997); Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,352 (1997) (Office of Management
and Budget) (notice and request for comments).
29. See Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act, H.R. 9, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3201 (1995); Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Act of
1995, H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
30. Proposed Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment, 61 Fed.
Reg. 47,552 (1996).
31. See id. (listing questions for commenters to address).
32. See

(1993).

NAT'L RES. COUNCIL,

ISSUES IN RISK ASSESSMENT

259-61
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far, been used to determine the full ecological consequences of
a nationwide rule. Indeed, a growing number of researchers insist that ecological theory is ill-equipped to range beyond sitespecific case studies to predict ecological consequences on a
broader scale.33 Yet this is what ecological risk assessment would
be called upon to do if cost-benefit analysis became the standard
for major federal regulations.
The rather immature state of the science of ecological risk assessment is also illustrated by the Forest Service's efforts to implement a regulation requiring that the agency's plans for the
national forests, which pertain to future actions such as timber
harvests, protect "viable populations" of forest species. 34 In attempting to predict the effects of future uses on species viability,
the Forest Service uses the "Delphi" method, which is essentially
an opinion poll of experts. 35 Strikingly subjective and utterly
opaque, this method involves asking panels of experts to estimate
the likelihood of species viability under various alternative
scenarios.36
Another basic challenge faced by ecological risk assessment is
the choice of the relevant endpoint. This choice is critical to the
33. See Sakotra Sarkar, Ecological Theory and Anuran Declines, 46 Bi.
OSCIENCE 199 (Mar. 1996); see also KR SHRADER-FRECHETrE & E.D. McCoY, METHOD IN ECoLoGy: STRATEGIES FOR CONSERVATION (1993); STUART
L. PIMM, THE BALANCE OF NATURE: ECOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE CONSERVATION OF SPECIES AND COMMUNITIES (1991).

34. The planning requirement is set forth in the National Forest
Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1600-87 (1996). The viability requirement appears at 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1996). For a wonderful and
thoughtful account of the Forest Service's implementation of the viability requirement, see Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and
Ecosystem Management 81 MINN. L. REV. 869 (1997).
35. See U.S. FOREST SERV., U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, FINAL
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON MANAGEMENT OF
HABITAT FOR LATE-SUCCESSIONAL AND OLD-GROWrH FOREST RELATED SPE-

116-17 (1994).
36. For a description of the Delphi method, see DOUGLAS N. SWAN.
STON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERV., PACIFIC NORTHCIES WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL

WEST RESEARCH STATION GENERAL TECHNICAL REPORT, SCIENTIFIC INFORMA-

TION AND THE TONGASS LAND MANAGEMENT PLAN: KEY FINDNGS FROM THE
SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE, SPECIES ASSESSMENTS, RESOURCE ANALYSES, WORK-

SHOPS AND RISK ASSESSMENT PANELS

386 (Nov. 1996).
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outcome of the risk assessment, as it will "directly influence the
type, characteristics, and interpretation of data and information,
. .. and the scale and character of the assessment." 37 EPA's proposed guidelines for ecological risk assessment define assessment
endpoints as the "explicit expressions of the actual environmental value that is to be protected," and provide that endpoints
must "include both a valued ecological entity and an attribute of
that entity that is important to protect and potentially at risk
(e.g., nesting and feeding success of piping plovers or areal extent and patch size of eel grass)."38

In human risk assessments, for better or worse, researchers
have predominantly focused on the endpoint of cancer.39 There
is no such readily identifiable endpoint of concern when it
comes to ecological risk. 40 EPA's guidelines provide that
endpoints should neither be too broad nor too narrow, 41 and
should reflect "values and organisms that people care about" but
not be "based on public perceptions alone." 42 Given the vagueness of these prescriptions, it is no wonder EPA cautions that
"ecological risk assessment is a rapidly evolving discipline," and
that EPA intends to develop more detailed guidance on specific
topics at a later date. 43
Compared to current methods used to estimate ecological
risks, the methods used to estimate human health risks seem exceedingly stable and transparent. EPA has long operated under
guidelines for assessing human cancer risks. 44 The fundamental
challenge has been to develop protocols for dealing with gaps in
data, protocols that have come to be known as "default assumptions." These include, for example, the assumptions that the
37. Proposed Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment, supra note
30, at 47,568.
38. Id. at 47,555.

39. See, e.g., David A. Wirth & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risky Reform, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 1857, 1864-65 (1995) (book review).
40. See NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 32, at 253.

41. See Proposed Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment, supra
note 30, at 47,568.
42. Id.

43. Id,at 47,560.
44. See Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg.
33,992 (1986).
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presence or absence of effects observed in one human population are predictive of effects in another exposed human population; that the presence or absence of effects observed in an
animal population are predictive of effects in an exposed human
population; and that a linear dose-response curve accurately describes the relationship between observed effects at high exposures and probable effects at low exposures. 4 Default assumptions like these have been the subject of intense scrutiny and
rethinking, 4 and yet they have survived essentially intact. Moreover, courts have regularly upheld agency estimates of human cancer risk based on quantitative risk assessments using these assumptions.4 7 There is, in other words, considerable agreement
about how to conduct cancer risk assessment in the face of incomplete information. Nevertheless, quantitative risk assessment
remains extremely controversial. Imagine, then, the controversy
that would attend risk assessments conducted according to the
vague, opaque, and fluid prescriptions for ecological risk assessment. Yet such assessments would be the necessary foundation
for any cost-benefit analysis of regulations designed to protect
natural resources.

45. For a clear description of the major default assumptions EPA
uses in conducting cancer risk assessments, see Proposed Guidelines
for Ecological Risk Assessment, supra note 30.
46. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RSK ASSESSMENT IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS

(1983). See also NATIONAL

RESEARCH COuNcIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEM-

OCRATIC SOCIETY (Paul C. Stem & Harvey U. Fineberg eds., 1996). In

response to criticisms of existing methods for assessing human cancer
risk, EPA has proposed new guidelines for this purpose. See Proposed
Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment, supra note 30.
47. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d
1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding Occupational Safety and Health Administration's rule limiting workplace exposure to ethylene oxide,
based on animal studies and no-threshold, linear dose-response
model); Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Dep't of
Health & Human Services, 720 F. Supp. 1244 (W.D. La. 1989) (upholding Health & Human Service's classification of certain chemicals as
known or suspected carcinogens based on results in animal studies).
48. For a concise discussion of the major criticisms, see BREYER,

supra note 7, at 42-50.
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Methods for valuing the benefits of natural resources that are
not directly traded in markets are equally undeveloped. Several
methods exist for measuring the valuation implied by private
market behavior relating to natural resources, such as the
purchase of property with unusual environmental amenities or
the expenditure of money to travel to a place with such attractions. 49 However, valuations based on the actual use of a natural
resource do not capture values which are not tied to use of those
resources, so-called "non-use" values. Generally speaking, nonuse values protect opportunities - to see an elephant in its natural setting, to have one's children see it, even to know that it exists at all. These benefits can be an important part of the value
we attach to natural resources, and indeed in some sense they
embody the quintessential reasons for protecting natural resources in the first place.
Currently, the only method for valuing the non-use benefits of
natural resources is contingent valuation. 5° Contingent valuation
is "damage assessment by public opinion poll";51 it uses surveys
to elicit the value each individual attaches to the preservation or
destruction of unpriced goods such as natural resources. Contingent valuation is, however, besieged by critics. Critics charge that
the hypothetical nature of contingent valuation surveys leads to
inflated valuations (put simply, survey respondents are not required to put their money where their mouth is);52 that survey
respondents frequently fail to distinguish between a subset of a
natural resource (such as a flock of snow geese) and the entire
resource (all snow geese);5 3 that responses differ markedly de-

49. See, e.g., Kenneth E. McConnell, Indirect Methods for Assessing
Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA, in VALUING NATURAL ASSETS:
THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 153-203
(1993); NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 32, at 263-64.
50. See generally R-G. CUMMINGS ET AL., VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL
GOODS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (1986).
51. Katherine K. Baker, Consorting with Forests: Rethinking Our Relationship to NaturalResources and How We Should Value Their Loss, 22 ECOLoGY L.Q 677, 680 (1995).
52. See PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 1195-96 (1994).
53. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Jack L. Knetsch, Valuing Public
Goods: The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction, 22 J. ENVrL. ECON. & MGMT. 57
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pending on whether a natural resource is being valued on its
own (such as one timber stand) or as part of a larger set of natu54
ral resources (such as all the forests in a multi-state region);
and that survey responses are acutely and unduly sensitive to the
way the questions are framed. On the last point, an issue of considerable importance is whether to frame questions in the "willingness-to-pay" format (how much would you be willing to pay to
avoid an oil spill equivalent to the Exxon-Valdez spill?) or "willingness-to-accept" format (how much would you accept in return
for allowing such a spill to occur?). Survey responses depend
dramatically on which type of question is asked; researchers have
found that the willingness-to-accept format leads to valuations
three to nineteen times greater than the willingness-to-pay format.55 Federal agencies conducting natural resource damage val-

uations have opted for the willingness-to-pay format in order to
avoid "disproportionately high" valuations. 56 But of course this
begs the question of valuation which the surveys are intended to
address.
The literature on contingent valuation is vast, and I have
sketched only the broadest outlines of the debate here. I hope I
have said enough to show, however, that any attempt to value
the benefits of regulation protecting natural resources will encounter severe methodological difficulties. In this regard, it is
telling that although federal agencies have begun to embrace
contingent valuation as a means of measuring the value of contaminated natural resources, 7 the few courts that have passed on
the' application of this method to actual cases have been hostile
to it.58

(1992).
54. This is known as the problem of "embedding." See Baker, supra
note 51, at 715.
55. See Daniel S. Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? Reconsidering Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural
Resources, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 493, 506-07 (1994).
56. State of Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 476
n.82 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
57. See Baker, supra note 51, at 681-82.
58. See MENELL & STEWART, supra note 52, at 1197 (noting that in
the one case using contingent valuation surveys to measure non-use val-

ues that has been brought to trial, the court disallowed evidence of
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In sum, methods for estimating and valuing risks to natural resources are at present too undeveloped to permit reasonably
thorough and reliable quantification of the benefits of regulation
protecting natural resources. And benefits that are unquantified
are famously disadvantaged - either ignored altogether or
59
"dwarfed" by quantified costs - in cost-benefit analysis.
B.

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis

Due to the difficulty of estimating the true value of the benefits of environmental regulation, some regulatory reformers have
turned away from arguments based on cost-benefit analysis and
6
have turned their attention instead to cost-effectiveness analysis. 0
One provision of the legislation accompanying the Contract With
America would have required agencies to adopt the most cost61
effective means of carrying out their regulatory responsibilities.
President Clinton's executive order on regulatory review contains
a similar requirement. 62 The general idea is that even if the current regulatory system produces more benefits than costs, it still
costs more than it has to, and the same benefits we now enjoy

non-use value based on this method). See also Mercado v. Ahmed, 756
F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff, 974 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1992) (excluding testimony relying on contingent valuation studies which purported to measure value of lost pleasure of life).
59. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1361-65, 1389-91
(1971); Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Tres: New
Foundationsfor Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1317-20 (1974).
60. See Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins, Regulatory Review of Environmental Policy: The Potential Role of Health-HealthAnalysis, in THE MORTALITY CosTs OF REGULATORY EXPENDITURES 112, 113 (W. Kip Viscusi ed.,
1994).
61. Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. 343, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
62. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993) (Regulatory Planning and Review § 1(b) (11)) ("Each agency shall tailor its regulations to impose the least burden on society, including individuals,
businesses of differing sizes, and other entities (including small communities and governmental entities), consistent with obtaining the regulatory objectives, taking into account, among other things, and to the
extent practicable, the costs of cumulative regulations.").
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could be obtained at a fraction of the cost. Unfortunately, evaluations of the cost-effectiveness of regulations have also begun to

focus on human lives saved as the signal measure of regulatory
success.

Two specific proposals have been offered to make the regulatory system more cost-effective. First, many scholars have argued
that the current system of environmental protection costs more
than it has to because it relies primarily on technology-based regulation. They have proposed using market-based regulation, such
as pollution taxes and emissions trading programs, to achieve the
same degree of environmental protection as a technology-based
regime, but at far lower cost.63 Second, many have argued that a
comparison of the costs per life saved of various federal regulations shows rich opportunities to save human lives at a relatively
low cost, and also shows that these opportunities have been
squandered by extravagant attention to tiny risks.64 In particular,
as noted above, the argument has been made that focusing more
attention on safety as opposed to health risks - for example, requiring the installation of smoke detectors in airplanes rather
than regulating arsenic in the ambient air - would improve the
cost-effectiveness of federal regulation. 6
As for the first set of claims, ensuring that market-based regulation achieves the same degree of environmental protection as
technology-based regulation is complicated. It requires both a
prediction, in the face of profound scientific uncertainty, of
human health effects and ecological consequences, and also a
means of comparing one type of impact with another. The temptation is to minimize the effect of scientific uncertainty by considering only the impacts current science allows us to measure,
and to mitigate the difficulty of comparing different kinds of

63. For the classic statements of this argument in the legal literature, see Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333 (1985); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for
Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988). For a general discussion, see Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14
STAN. ENvTL. LJ. 300, 305-10 (1995).

64. See, e.g., Morrall, supra note 12; sources cited, supra note 18.
65. See Morrall, supra note 12, at 32-33.
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measurable impacts to each other by considering only one kind
of impact.
That is indeed what appears to be happening with the current
experiments in market-based regulation that are known as "environmental contracting" or "alternative compliance." These approaches, illustrated most famously by the Clinton administration's "Project XL, 66 allow firms to develop their own strategies
for complying with environmental regulation, provided that they
achieve the same degree of environmental protection as standard
regulatory requirements would achieve.
Comparing the environmental consequences of conventional
and experimental regulation would be simple if experiments
such as Project XL did not allow flexibility across pollutants and
across environmental media. Put another way, if Project XL
merely allowed a firm to emit more sulfur dioxide from one
smokestack in return for emitting less sulfur dioxide from an adjacent smokestack, comparing the environmental consequences
of conventional standards and Project XL would require only a
simple comparison of sulfur dioxide emissions. Yet a regulatory
innovation limited in this way would quickly reach the limits of
its advantage over current programs, and indeed, in some contexts, might merely duplicate the flexibility already provided by
current law. 67 For this reason, Project XL has allowed firms far
more flexibility than this. They may, for example, trade off increased sulfur dioxide emissions for decreased emissions of volatile organic compounds, or, more generally, increased water pollution for decreased air pollution.6 But these cross-pollutant and
cross-media tradeoffs make it hard to figure out whether the new

66. Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg.
27,282 (1995) (solicitation of proposals and request for comment).
67. See Chevron U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (upholding EPA's "bubble" policy, allowing
firms flexibility in complying with certain provisions of the Clean Air
Act).
68. For a description and thoughtful analysis of several Project XL
proposals, see Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Project XL:
Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes?, 26 ENvrL. L. REP. 10,527 (1996). For
a critical analysis of the entire Project XL enterprise, see Rena I.
Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The DangerousJourney from
Command to Self-Control 22 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 103 (1998).

1997]

REDUCTIONIST REGULATORY REFORM

regime provides the same degree of environmental protection as
the old.
At first, somewhat astonishingly, EPA officials explicitly refused
to establish an environmental baseline against which new compliance strategies could be measured. In other words, EPA refused
to decide whether compliance strategies would be evaluated according to total emissions, ambient concentrations, human impacts, ecosystem impacts, or some other measure of environmen-

tal harm. 69 Increasingly, however, this indecision is proving
untenable, as the newly flexible programs threaten to become a
kind of "regulatory free-for-all" in which it is impossible to say
whether firms' suggested compliance strategies are, from an environmental perspective, better than, worse than, or equivalent to
standard strategies. 70 To mitigate this difficulty, EPA is consider-

ing whether to allow quantitative risk assessment as a means of
assessing the environmental impacts of proposed programs
under Project XL.71 In practice, this would mean that the yardstick for determining whether proposed compliance strategies
provide the same degree of environmental protection as conventional requirements would be human health risk and, more nar-

rowly still, human cancer risk.72 As a result, in choosing compli69. See Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Project XL, supra note 68,

at 10,529 (quoting Memorandum from David Gardiner, Assistant Administrator, U.S. EPA, OPPE, on Draft Principles for Development of
Project XL Final Project Agreements 10-11 (Dec. 1, 1995)) ("A consideration of environmental performance first requires consideration of
the unit of measure. This was not specifically defined in the Project XL
Federal Register notice in order to encourage creativity on the part of
project sponsors. Projects may seek to define environmental baselines
in any number of ways, such as general environmental indicators, pollutant emissions, ambient concentrations, or human or ecosystem impacts ....").
70. Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Project XI, supra note 68, at
10,529; see also Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation, supra note

68, at 137-38.
71. See Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Project XL, supra note 68,

at 10,531.
72. See, e.g., Wirth & Silbergeld, supra note 39, at 1865; see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT

41

(1994) (noting claim that current methodologies for quantitative risk
assessment are primarily aimed at assessing human cancer risk).

476

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VIII

ance strategies under these new programs, ecological
consequences may be left out of the picture entirely except insofar as they fortuitously coincide with human cancer risks.
Reforms based on comparison of the costs per human life
saved of various regulatory interventions follow a similarly reductionist path. As discussed above, comparing costs per life saved
explicitly excludes any consideration other than saving human
lives when judging regulations, thus understating the benefits of
health regulation designed to protect both human health and
the environment.
Even if one's only concern were human health, current estimates of the cost per human life saved of federal regulations
would still understate the benefits of many health regulations.
Consider again John Morrall's famous table. The human health
benefits of the regulations found at the bottom of the table according to Morrall, the least cost-effective of the regulations he
reviewed - were estimated by the agencies using quantitative
risk assessments. These quantitative assessments almost invariably
considered only human cancer risk.73 The table's estimates of the
number of lives saved by these regulations thus exclude not only
ecological consequences, but also noncancer human health effects, despite the fact that in promulgating the rules the agencies
often expressed a clear goal of preventing (unquantified) health

73. See Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Dibromide, 48 Fed.
Reg. 45,956 (1983) (proposed rule) (quantitative risk assessment for
ethylene dibromide ("EDB") considered only cancer risk); National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions
From Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, and Benzene Storage Vessels, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,558 (1984) (withdrawing proposed benzene/storage, benzene/ethylbenzenol styrene, and benzene/
maleic anhydride standards on ground that risk from leukemia, the
only risk quantified in proposing the standards, was "too small to warrant federal regulatory action"); National Emission Standards For Hazardous Air Pollutants; Standards For Inorganic Arsenic, 51 Fed. Reg.
27,956 (1986) (final rule) (standards for arsenic/glass manufacturing
and arsenic/low-arsenic copper based on cancer risks); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Regulation of Radionuclides, 49 Fed. Reg. 43,906 (1984) (withdrawing proposed standards for radionuclides at DOE facilities and at elemental phosphorous
plants; proposed standards based on estimates of cancer risk alone).
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effects other than cancer.74 The absurdity of relying on the results of cancer-driven quantitative risk assessments to fully account for the benefits of these rules is brought home by imagining that the same test were applied to the rules at the top of the
list, the safety rules Morrall defends. According to Morrall, one
of the most cost-effective federal regulations is the rule pertaining to unvented space heaters, which reportedly saves lives at a
cost of $100,000 apiece. 75 Unvented space heaters pose a risk of
death from carbon monoxide poisoning. 76 Suppose that this regulation were judged according to a quantitative risk assessment
which estimated how many cancer deaths would be prevented by
the rule. The answer would be zero, as the regulation is not designed to prevent human cancer.
In short, if cost-effectiveness is to be the measure of the wisdom and validity of environmental regulations, the identification
of the goals of regulation - the achievement of which determines cost-effectiveness - becomes critical. And in this context,
too, regulatory reforms appear to assume that the only goal of
environmental regulation is to protect human health.
C.

Risk Tradeoffs

The identification of risk tradeoffs, or ways in which regulation
designed to decrease risk may in fact increase risk, has become a
pervasive feature of the literature on risk regulation. A recent
74. See, e.g., Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and
Distribution in Commerce Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,468
(1989) (final rule); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, Benzene Emissions from Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, 45 Fed.

Reg. 83,448-49 (1980) (proposed rule); Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Dibromide, 48 Fed. Reg. 45,956 (1983) (Occupational Safety and
Health Administration) (notice of proposed rulemaking); Occupational
Exposure to Asbestos, Tremolite, Anthophyllite, and Actinolite, 51 Fed.
Reg. 22,612, 22,666 (1986) (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) (final rules); Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Oxide, 49
Fed. Reg. 25,734, 25,765-66 (1984) (final standard); Hazardous Waste
Management, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,714-15 (1986) (proposed rule).
75. See Morrall, supra note 12, at 30 tbl. 4.

76. See Safety Standard Requiring Oxygen Depletion Safety Shutoff
Systems (ODS) for Unvented Gas-Fired Space Heaters, 45 Fed. Reg.

61,880 (1980) (Consumer Product Safety Commission).
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book on the subject consists largely of a series of case studies
describing the countervailing risks created by various regulatory
requirements." Other writings on risk regulation similarly spend
a good deal of time exposing the unintended consequences of
78
regulations intended to reduce risk.
Two basic kinds of risk tradeoffs have been described so far.
First, the cost of regulations designed to reduce risks may itself
increase risk through effects on personal income. "Richer is
safer," in other words: income affects health, and so decreases in
income brought about by regulation may impair health as well as
wealth. 79 Second, regulations may create "risk offsets" or "substitution risks."80 To cite a tragic example that has lately been much
in the news, air bags designed to protect adults from the impact
81
of a. crash may kill more children than they save.
The existence - some would say ubiquity8 2 - of risk tradeoffs,
and the perception that agencies have been insufficiently attentive to such tradeoffs, have led to calls for an explicit requirement that agencies take account of risk tradeoffs in making regulatory decisions. One provision of the legislation accompanying
the Contract With America would have required agencies to consider "substitution risks" created by regulations. 83 Legal academics have similarly recommended requiring analysis of risk tradeoffs. 84 Because it "measures benefits in . . . physical rather than

77. RISK vERsus RISI TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
78. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxesof the Regulatory State, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 407 (1990).
79. For a preliminary but classic statement of this argument, see
Aaron Wildavsky, Richer is Safer, 60 PuB. INTEREST 23, 27-29 (1980).
80. Viscusi, Regulating the Regulaton, sup-a note 8, at 1449.
81. For a poignant discussion, see Robert C. Sanders, Air Bags Can
Kill Kids, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at A23.
82. See John P. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk
Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 77, at 12 (risk tradeoffs are
"ubiquitous").
83. Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995, H.R. 1022, 104th
Cong. § 105(4), 1st Sess. (Feb. 23, 1995), in 141 Cong. Rec. H2261,
H2263 (Feb. 27, 1995).
84. Cass R.Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533,
1564-67 (1996).
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monetary units," risk tradeoff analysis offers the possibility of
eluding the valuation difficulties that have dogged cost-benefit
85

analysis.
Unfortunately, however, much risk tradeoff analysis also tends
to proceed as if the only goal of environmental law were to protect human health. This reductionism is especially glaring with
respect to the first category of risk tradeoffs described above, the
mortality allegedly caused by reductions in income due to regulatory costs.
Several studies have found a correlation between wealth and
health. Building on these studies, researchers have attempted to
identify the level at which regulatory expenditures will produce
one fatality by reducing individual wealth. One frequently cited
range of estimates for this level is $3 to 7.5 million, from a study
by Ralph Keeney.86 Numerous problems have been raised with respect to such estimates, including the possibility that the wealthhealth relationship may not work in the direction researchers
like Keeney have assumed; that is, wealthy people might be
wealthy partly because they are healthy, rather than the other
way around. 7 One effort to avoid this causal issue produced an
estimate of the level of regulatory expenditures that will cause
one fatality that is approximately ten times the level cited by Keeney.88 Another problem with attempts to identify a uniform level

85. Portney & Stavins, supra note 60, at 118; see also Sunstein,
Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra note 84, at 1549-52.
86. For the original study, see Ralph Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced
by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK ANALYsis 147 (1990); for discussions relying on this estimate, see, e.g., UAW v. OSHA, 938 F2d 1310, 1326-27
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams, J., concurring); BREYER, supra note 7, at 23;
Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra note 84, at 1544.
87. In his oftcited study of the relationship between regulatory
expenditures and mortality, Keeney himself simply assumed that
"higher incomes will lead to lower mortality risks." See Keeney, supra
note 86, at 149. But See, e.g., C.P. Wen et al., Anatomy of the Healthy
Worker Effect: A Critical Review, 25 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 283 (1983) (dis-

cussing studies suggesting that "healthy worker effect" is a result of selection for employability, meaning that healthy people are the ones
who get jobs).
88. See Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, supra note 8, at 1454 (estimating level of regulatory expenditures necessary to induce one fatality
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at which regulatory costs will induce one fatality is that they ignore the fact that regulatory costs will be distributed differently
in different contexts. Because the relationship between health
and wealth is "highly nonlinear"8 9 (Donald Trump is unlikely to
be less healthy than Bill Gates just because he has less money
than Bill Gates), the actual distribution of regulatory costs in an
individual case will make a large difference in determining
whether the costs in fact impair anyone's health 0
Most important for purposes of this paper, health-health analysis, as the name suggests, considers only the impact of regulation
on human health. It does not consider the ecological consequences of nonregulation. In this respect, it is noteworthy that
scholars have argued, again using John Morrall's versatile figures
on cost-effectiveness, that health-health analysis should be used
to reject many of the regulations appearing in Morrall's table.
Professor Viscusi, for example, has argued that all of the listed
regulations costing more than $50 million per life saved fail
health-health analysis. 91 Yet most of the "failing" regulations are
not only, and perhaps not even primarily, designed to protect
human health. They are also designed to protect natural resources. Thus the tradeoffs are not so clearcut even if one accepted the controversial methodology of health-health analysis.
Reductionism also tends to pervade analyses of the second
type of risk tradeoff, involving substitution risks. When it comes
to evaluating the tradeoffs of safety standards, it makes sense to
look only at the human health consequences of the standards. It
would be bizarre, for example, to criticize a failure to consider
the ecological consequences of licensing the elderly driver9 or of

to be $50 million).
89. Portney & Stavins, supra note 60, at 116.
90. Cf Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra note 84, at 1549.
91. See Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, supra note 8, at 1454-55. See
also Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra note 84, at 1544-48 (noting
that estimates of the level of regulatory costs inducing one fatality
range from $3 - $12 million, and pointing to Morrall's table as evidence that "some regulations fail health-health analysis whether or not
they pass cost-benefit analysis").
92. See Constance Williams & John D. Graham, Licensing the Elderly
Driver, in RISK vRsus RIsK, supra note 77, at 72-86.
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recommending annual mammograms for women between the
ages of 40 and 50. 93 Obviously, such policies are concerned only
with human health. But the same one-dimensional approach has
been embraced even in assessing the tradeoffs implicit in regulatory decisions affecting both human health and natural
resources.
This reductionism is evident in what the regulatory reformers
consider to be the mistakes of the past. Two commonly cited decisions purportedly show insufficient attention to risk tradeoffs:
EPA's decisions banning DDT and asbestos. Let us see, then, how
the agency treated the risk tradeoffs involved in those decisions.
In banning DDT, EPA cited the pesticide's demonstrated adverse effects on wildlife and its potential adverse effects on
humans. 94 The agency forthrightly acknowledged uncertainty
about DDT's effects on humans, but concluded that the persistence of DDT in the environment, its accumulation in fat tissue,
and its transportability made this uncertainty potentially very
costly.95 EPA also recognized that banning DDT created a substitution risk: the likely substitute for DDT, methyl parathion, was
more acutely toxic to humans than DDT, and thus posed a
greater risk to those working closely with the pesticide, primarily
farm workers. 96 The agency hoped, however, that improved labeling and training would mitigate much of this increased risky.
EPA's decision to ban DDT has been criticized by those who
advocate closer attention to risk tradeoffs. These critics have observed, as EPA itself did, that the substitutes for DDT, the organophosphates (including methyl parathion), are more acutely
toxic than DDT.98 In fixing attention on the acutely toxic effects
93. For discussion, see Gary Taubes, The Breast-Screening Brawl 275

Sci. 1056 (Feb. 21, 1997).
94. See Consolidated DDT Hearings, 37 Fed. Reg. 13,369, 13,370-71
(1972) (opinion and order of the administrator).
95. See id. at 13,370-71.

96. See id. at 13,374 ("The record before me leaves no doubt that
the chief substitute for most uses of DDT, methyl parathion, is a highly
toxic chemical and, if misused, is dangerous to applicators.").
97. See id. (delaying effective date of order to give time to begin
educating workers who would use methyl parathion as a substitute for
DDT).
98. See George M. Gray & John D. Graham, Regulating Pesticides, in
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of DDT's substitutes on farm workers, as compared to the
chronic effects of DDT in the general population, however, these
critics ignore the vast and devastating environmental consequences of DDT.99
Moreover, at the time of its decision, EPA was aware of, and
indeed, as I have mentioned, it explicitly acknowledged, the
tradeoff between the risks of DDT and the risks of methyl parathion. To the extent that advocates of risk tradeoff analysis
merely seek to make regulators aware of the tradeoffs they face,
and to make them consider these tradeoffs before they act, the
decision to ban DDT seems unassailable. The agency recognized
the tradeoff and even established requirements designed to mitigate it. Thus any criticism of the DDT ban based on EPA's simple inattention to risk tradeoffs is misguided.
One might, however, question EPA's ban of DDT on two additional grounds related to risk tradeoffs. First, EPA did not make
any attempt to quantify the target or countervailing risks in question. If risk tradeoff analysis requires that tradeoffs be numerically quantified rather than merely described in qualitative terms,
EPA's decision to ban DDT is vulnerable. But requiring quantification inadequately appreciates EPA's dilemma; could the agency
afford to wait for the information permitting quantification,
while in the meantime the chemical it was studying was accumulating in people and wildlife everywhere? Quantification in the
context of risk tradeoff analysis is plagued by the same scientific
uncertainty that dooms quantification elsewhere. If quantification
of substitution risks is required, protection of natural resources
will likely suffer, for reasons already discussed.1°
A second way to criticize the DDT ban on risk tradeoff
grounds would be simply to say that EPA got the balance of risks
wrong; it should not have traded off acute and known risks to
workers for chronic and unquantified effects on wildlife and the
general population. But this would be to say that risk tradeoff
analysis is a means of second-guessing the merits of agency deci-

RISK VERSUS RiSK, supra note 77, at 173-74, 179, 189.

99. Catalogued most famously in
(1962).
100. See supra, Part IIA.

RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING
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sions. This would assign risk tradeoff analysis a far more central
and substantive role in judging agency action than has heretofore been asserted for it. 01 And, if risk tradeoff analysis is to be
assigned this substantive role, natural resources will again be the
likely losers, as the benefits of protecting them are so hard to
measure.
The same observations apply to EPA's decision to ban asbestos,
another favorite topic in the literature on risk tradeoffs. 1 2 In
banning asbestos, EPA acknowledged that the products that
would likely be substituted for asbestos might also pose risks;
some of the materials that would be used for insulation if asbestos were banned were themselves carcinogens, and non-asbestos
brake linings might be less effective and thus riskier than asbestos brake linings.10 The agency chose to ban asbestos anyway, explaining that it had "more concern about the continued use and
exposure to asbestos than it has for the future replacement of asbestos in the products subject to this rule with other fibrous substitutes," and that "regulatory decisions about asbestos which
poses well-recognized, serious risks should not be delayed until
the risk of all replacement materials are fully quantified." 1°4 In
reviewing EPA's rule, the Fifth Circuit took the agency's statements on substitute products to mean that EPA had made a "decision not to evaluate" the risks posed by substitutes, and overturned the ban on this ground, among others. 1°5
Again, however, EPA did not fail to consider substitute risks; it
simply failed to quantify them. Unless the proposals for
mandatory risk tradeoff analysis would require quantification of
risk tradeoffs, or would allow second-guessing of agency judg-

101. An exception is Warren & Marchant, supra note 20, at 417-28,
(explicitly calling for judicial review of the substance of agency
decisions).
102. See, e.g.,Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra note 84, at

1566.
103.
tribution
29,494-95
104.
105.
1991).

See Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Disin Commerce Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,481-83,
(1989) (final rule).
Id. at 29,481, 29,483.
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1221 (5th Cir.
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ments on the merits, it is hard to see where EPA went wrong in
banning asbestos.
In sum, the frequent criticisms of EPA's bans of DDT and asbestos in the literature on risk tradeoffs suggests that advocates
of risk tradeoff analysis have a particular kind of analysis in
mind, and that is quantitative analysis of risk tradeoffs. Thus, it is
surprising that few scholars have attempted such quantitative
analysis themselves. One notable exception is the discussion of
the risks of eating contaminated fish in a chapter of a thoughtful
recent book on risk tradeoffs, Risk versus Risk. In this essay, Paul
Anderson and Jonathan Wiener compare the risk of getting cancer from eating fish contaminated by certain synthetic chemicals
with the risk of dying from heart disease as a result of not eating
fish. 0 6 They reach the stunning conclusion that this country's
death rate from heart disease could be cut by more than one-third
if the average American would just eat an average of one meal of
fish every five days instead of one meal every ten days107 According to the authors, the cardiovascular benefits of eating any fish
far outweigh the cancer risks from eating contaminated fish. 0 8
Eating Fish, however, demonstrates the potential pitfalls of
quantitative risk tradeoff analysis. First of all, the essay ignores
natural resources; it does not even mention the ecological consequences of chemical contamination of the nation's waters. Indeed, in one parenthetical remark, the authors question whether
it makes sense to spend more money reducing this contamination when we could instead be saving human lives by encouraging fish consumption - implying that the only tradeoffs here involve human health. 109 To be sure, the essay explicitly concerns
itself only with the implications of risk tradeoff analysis for dietary recommendations (in favor of low-fat diets including fish)
and fish advisories (warning against consumption of chemicallycontaminated fish), and thus is, by design, concerned only with
risks to humans.11 0 But this just illustrates another danger of risk

106. Paul Anderson & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Eating Fish, in RISK
supra note 77, at 104-23.
\
107. See id. at 110.
108. See id. at 117.
109. See id. at 119.
110. See id. at 105-06.

VERSUS RIsK,
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tradeoff analysis: the risk tradeoffs identified in the analysis will
often be entirely dependent on the way the regulatory intervention is framed.
The risk tradeoff described in Eating Fish seems so poignant
precisely because the scope of the essay was confined to regulatory interventions involving human health. The tradeoff would
have been much blurrier if ecological consequences, and laws relating to water quality, had been added to the calculus. The
omission of ecological consequences from this chapter of Risk
versus Risk is all the more striking when one considers the rest of
the book, which is in substantial part a brief in favor of more attention to ecological consequences. In a way, then, the chapter
itself unwittingly illustrates the point I have been trying to make:
an insistence upon the precise quantification of the risks and
benefits of regulation will tend to shunt ecological consequences
to the side, despite the analysts' best intentions.
Eating Fish also demonstrates another danger of quantitative
risk tradeoff analysis, and that is the temptation to make too
much of existing data. For their fantastic conclusions about the
disease-preventative properties of fish consumption, Anderson
and Wiener rely on a Danish study finding that eating fish decreases one's chances of dying from heart disease."' Anderson
and Wiener conclude that the study must also stand for the converse proposition: that not eating fish increases one's chances of
mortality from heart disease.112 But this is a fallacious use of the
Danish study, which tested only the consequences of a one-way
intervention (eating fish), not the consequences of two different
interventions (eating fish and not eating fish).3 It is also worth
noting that the ninety-five percent confidence bounds of the
Danish study included a relative risk of one; that is, according to
the conventional measure of scientific certainty, the study came
to the unremarkable conclusion that the risks of heart disease
for those who eat fish were either less, more, or the same as for
1 14
those who do not eat fish.

111.
112.
113.
114.
study).

See id. at 108-09.
See id. at 109.
See id. at 108.
Id, at 109 tbl.6.1 (showing 95% confidence bounds of relevant
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A subsequent study by the same scientists found that the association between fish intake and mortality from coronary heart
disease became non-significant when confounding effects were
taken into account. 15 In addition, a large epidemiologic study of
the effects of fish oils on coronary heart disease in American
male health professionals recently found no significant association between fish intake and the risk of coronary heart disease.
Specifically, the study concluded that "increasing fish intake
from one to two servings per week to five to six servings per
week does not substantially reduce the risk of coronary heart disease among men who are initially free of cardiovascular
disease. "

116

Thus, as to the merits of quantitative risk tradeoff analysis, one
might paraphrase Justice Marshall's famous warning in the Benzene case: "To require a quantitative showing of [countervailing
risks], therefore, would either paralyze [government] into inaction or force [it] to deceive the public by acting on the basis of
assumptions that must be considered too speculative to support
117
any realistic assessment of the relevant risk."
To summarize, risk tradeoff analysis is not easily confined to
the rather narrow role that its proponents assert for it. If the
DDT and asbestos bans were misguided with respect to risk
tradeoffs, they were so only because the agency failed either to
quantify the countervailing risks or failed to come out right on
the merits. In either case, this suggests a large and powerful role
for risk tradeoff analysis, and one likely uncongenial to the protection of natural resources.
D.

Comparative Risk Analysis

In 1987, EPA managers ranked thirty-one environmental
problems based on the managers' own views of the seriousness of
115. See D. Kromhout et al., Alcoho, Fish, Fibre and Antioxidant Vitamins Intake Do Not Explain Population Differences in Coronay Heart Disease
Mortality, 25 INT'L J. EPDEMIOLOGY 753 (Aug. 1996).
116. A. Ascherio et al., Dietary Intake of Marine n-3 Fatty Acids, Fish
Intake, and the Risk of Coronary Disease Among Men, 332 NEw ENG. J. MED.
977, 977 (1995).
117. AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 716
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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those problems. Their report, Unfinished Business: A Comparative
Assessment of Environmental Problems, came to the rather startling

and troubling conclusion that many of the problems receiving
top regulatory priority were not, in the opinion of these experts,
the most important problems. At the same time, several threats
deemed more serious by this group were receiving little or no
regulatory attention. For example, EPA experts deemed the risk
from indoor air pollution - a problem given essentially no regulatory priority at that time - to be high, while concluding that
the risk from hazardous waste sites - a problem consuming a
large proportion of agency and societal resources, then and now
-

to be medium to low.118

Based on these findings, EPA managers concluded that the
agency should rearrange its regulatory priorities by first comparing the risks of substances and activities potentially subject to
regulation, and then concentrating its regulatory resources on
the highest-ranked risks.119 A follow-up study by EPA's Science
Advisory Board also concluded that EPA's priorities should be reordered by giving greater attention to relative risk.120 For its part,
the Clinton administration has required a form of comparative
121
risk analysis for major federal regulations.
Another boost to the movement for comparative risk analysis
came with the publication, in Science magazine, of an article by
scientists Bruce Ames, Renae Magaw, and Lois Gold.122 In this ar-

118. See EPA,

OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, UNFINISHED BUSINESS:

COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

119. See id. at ii, 95.
120. See EPA, SCIENCE

A

(1987).

ADVISORY BOARD, REDUCING RISK SETTING PRI-

ORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEcrION

16, 19-20 (1990)

[hereinafter EPA, REDUCING RiSK]. For a general discussion of the Science Advisory Board's report and recommendations, see Robert F.
Blomquist, The EPA Science Advisory Board's Report on "Reducing Risk":
Some Overarching Observations Regarding the Public Interest, 22 ENVFL. L.

149 (1992).
121. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993) (Regulatory Planning and Review, § l(b) (4)) ("In setting regulatory priorities,
each agency shall consider, to the extent reasonable, the degree and
nature of the risks posed by various substances or activities within its
jurisdiction.").
122. Bruce N. Ames et al., Ranking Possible CarcinogenicHazards, 236

488

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VIII

ticle, Ames and his colleagues developed a scale for comparing
the carcinogenic risks to humans posed by various substances.
This scale, the so-called "HERP index," expresses carcinogenic
risks as the ratio of estimated human exposures ("Human Exposure dose") to the daily dose rate of the substance required to
halve the percentage of tumor-free rodents, or the dose that
causes cancer in half of the animals studied ("Rodent Potency
dose"). Based on the HERP index, Ames and his colleagues contended that the risks we face from such seemingly benign items
as mushrooms, celery, figs, and alfalfa sprouts are similar to
those we face from PCBs, dioxin, benzene, and synthetic pesticides.12 3 With this stunning conclusion, it is no surprise that this
article made a splash in the popular pressx2 and led to calls for
increased use of comparative risk analysis in setting regulatory
priorities.125
In theory, comparative risk assessment need not fall prey to
the kind of reductionism I have discussed in this paper; that is, it
need not concern itself solely with risks to human health. In theory, certainly, quantitative methods for assessing ecological risk
can be developed, and recently there has been some movement
in this direction.1 26 Indeed, in describing what EPA's priorities
might look like if they were rearranged based on comparative
risk assessment, the Agency's Science Advisory Board called for
greater attention to ecological risk, stating that the "EPA should
attach as much importance to reducing ecological risk as it does
to reducing human health risk." 127 Specifically, the Board recom-

Sci. 271 (Apr. 17, 1987).
123. See id. at 273 tbl.1.
124. See, e.g., Jane E. Brody, New Index Finds Some Cancer Dangers
Are Overrated and Others Ignored, N.Y TIMEs, Apr. 17, 1987, at A10; Harold Gilliam, Mother Nature's Own Carcinogens, S.F. CHRON., June 2, 1981,
at 10/Z1.
125. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 7, at 17 (equating risks of
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) with risk from eating a raw mushroom, and risk of the grain fumigant ethyl dibromide (EDB) with risk
of swimming for an hour in a chlorinated swimming pool, and questioning current regulatory priorities on basis of such comparisons).
126. See supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text (discussing EPA's
proposed guidelines for ecological risk assessment).
127. EPA, REDUCING RISK, supra note 120, at 17.
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mended that more regulatory resources be devoted to habitat alteration and destruction, species extinction and loss of biodivers128
ity, stratospheric ozone depletion, and global climate change.
Again, however, one must distinguish theory and practice.
Comparative risk assessment has always had a close working relationship with quantitative risk assessment: "[q]uantitative risk assessment has been employed not only to evaluate risks from individual chemicals, but also to compare risks from different
substances. ' 129 As a result, comparisons among risks have
predominantly focused on statistical probabilities of human morbidity and mortality. 130 This fixation on human sickness and
death ignores the nonstatistical features of risk such as autonomy, equity, and community. 131 It also tends to ignore noncancer
health effects in humans.1 32 And, most pertinent to the current
discussion, quantitative risk assessment centers on risks to
1 33
humans.
Seen in this light, two of the major recommendations of EPA's
Science Advisory Board in its report on regulatory priorities that resources be targeted to the greatest risks based on "the
most advanced risk assessment and comparison methodologies" 134
and that ecological risk receive greater attention 35 - are in tension with each other. Admittedly, the Science Advisory Board rec-

128. See id. at 13.
.129. Wirth & Silbergeld, supra note 39, at 1865.
130. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Regulation of Radionuclides, 49 Fed. Reg. 43,906 (1984) (withdrawal of proposed standards) (comparing probabilistic cancer risks
from anthropogenic radionuclide emissions to risks from background
radiation); BREYER, supra note 7, at 5 (comparing risks from various
substances and activities to risks from smoking certain number of cigarettes over a lifetime).
131. For the most comprehensive critique of comparative risk assessment on this score, see Hornstein, supra note 24. See also RoseAckerman, supra note 17, at 586.
132. See Wirth & Silbergeld, supra note 39, at 1865, 1874-75.
133. For a concise catalogue of the values ignored by comparative
risk assessment, see John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in
Itself. The Role of Risk Assessment in Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U.
GIN. L. REv. 1643, 1658-66 (1995).
134. EPA, REDUCING RisK, supra note 120, at 16.
135. See id. at 18.
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ognized that improved methodologies for assessing ecological
risk are needed. 13 6 But while those methodologies are being developed, natural resource protection will suffer if regulatory pri137
orities are based on quantitative risk assessment.
Even if we could measure with perfect accuracy the ecological
consequences of various regulatory approaches, this would still
leave the problem of comparing disparate outcomes. This is hard
enough where only human health is involved; consider the difficulty of comparing the cancer risks of benzene with the cognitive
risks of lead.13a But where there is no common metric like
human health, precise comparisons become even more problematic. Thus the hope that comparative risk assessment will provide
a "common language" 139 for comparing risks must prove forlorn
if comparative risk assessment takes account, as it should, of risks
to natural resources.
III.

REDUCTIONISM'S RISKS

The environmental laws that are of concern in this paper laws regulating the pollution of air, water, and land - have the
dual purpose of protecting human health and the environment.
In most cases agencies writing regulations under these laws will
take the protection of human beings as their first concern. Thus
their quantitative analysis of risks will begin with threats to
humans. My point is that, because of the difficulty of measuring
and valuing risks to natural resources, their analysis is likely to
end there as well. Thus natural resource protection will often
end up as a kind of tag-along value, icing on the cake of a regu-

136. See id.
137. Cf. Hornstein, supra note 24, at 626 (noting "the tendency of
comparative risk analysis to reduce complex environmental problems to
simpler ones that are easier to compare" and to ignore certain environmental effects "because these effects involve consequences that cannot
be even roughly estimated.").
138. See Wirth & Silbergeld, supra note 39, at 1865; see also Applegate, supra note 133, at 1660.
139. EPA, REDUCING RisK, supra note 120, at 2 ("The concept of
environmental risk, together with its related terminology and analytical
methodologies, helps people discuss disparate environmental problems
with a common language.").
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lation otherwise justified by the benefits of improving human
health. I will illustrate this dynamic, and the problems it would
create if the regulatory reforms discussed above became law, by
describing two of EPA's most prominent regulatory efforts to
date: the nationwide ban on asbestos and the recent decision to
tighten air quality standards for ozone.
In 1989, EPA banned virtually all uses of asbestos in this country. In doing so, the agency relied on the one environmental statute we have which permits comprehensive, cross-media regulation (including bans) of pollutants, across industries and
contexts. This statute, the Toxic Substances Control Act, 14° requires consideration of the costs and benefits of regulation, including consideration of the effects of the chemical in question
on human health and the environment. 4 ' EPA spent ten years
and accumulated a 45,000-page record on the way to its decision
banning asbestos. Ultimately, the agency concluded that the ban
would save at least 202 lives that would have been lost to cancer
over a thirteen-year period, and many more lives that would have
been lost due to other diseases and due to cancer in later
years. 42 Throughout its explanation of its final rule, the agency
cautioned that its numerical estimates of costs and benefits overstated costs and understated benefits. 43
In one short paragraph, EPA described the environmental effects of the asbestos ban. The agency explained that the risks to
human health were the "most readily quantifiable consequences
of the commercial use of asbestos" and were sufficient, standing
alone, to support the rule.'" However, the agency also expressed
concern about the environmental effects of asbestos, on account
of studies showing that asbestos caused serious health effects in
animals and humans and on account of the persistence and
transportability of asbestos in the environment. The agency did
not attempt to quantify these effects, stating simply that "EPA be140. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a)-(c) (1996).
141. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c) (1).
142. See Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,468
(1989).
143. See generally id.
144. Id. at 29,480.
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lieves that continued asbestos use will leave a legacy of serious
health and environmental effects due to unnaturally high concentrations of asbestos in the ambient air."145
Thus, in the cost-benefit analysis of the asbestos ban, benefits
to wildlife and other natural resources became a kind of add-on
benefit, almost a postscript to the description of the human
health benefits of the rule. This arrangement of priorities is perhaps not surprising in the case of asbestos, which is one of only
a handful of environmental agents "repeatedly and strongly
linked to human cancer." 146 With the human health risks so well
documented, further consideration and quantification of the ecological consequences of continued asbestos use must have appeared, to the agency at least, unnecessary; for the agency, the
rule was more than adequately justified by its effects on human
health. The agency's confidence proved mistaken when the Fifth
Circuit overturned the asbestos ban because it adjudged the balance of costs and benefits differently from the agency. In particular, the court took the agency to task for relying on unquantified
benefits in justifying its ban. 147
A similar arrangement of priorities, with human health the
dominant concern, and natural resources deeply subordinate, appears in other contexts in which EPA has assessed the benefits of
federal regulation. The most recent example comes from EPA's
decision to revise the primary and secondary air quality standards for ground-level ozone. 14 The primary air quality standards
must be set at a level adequate to protect human health, while
the secondary standards protect other aspects of public welfare
including natural resources. 149 In theory, then, EPA could use

145. Id.
146. Gary Taubes & Charles C. Mann, Epidemiology Faces Its Limits,
269 Sci. 164-65 (July 14, 1995).
147. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1218-19
(5th Cir. 1991).
148. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone: Final
Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (1997) (to be codified as 40 C.F.R. pt. 50
(1997)) [hereinafter Final Rule].
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)-(2) (1996) (primary ambient air
quality standards must protect the "public health," secondary standards
the "public welfare"); 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (1996) (defining "effects on
welfare" to include "effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade
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secondary air quality standards in order to provide natural resources a layer of protection above and beyond that deemed to
be adequately protective of human health. EPA has, however,
typically declined to issue secondary standards that are more
stringent than the primary standards. 150 In proposing new primary and secondary standards for ozone, EPA discussed the possibility of breaking with this precedent, and establishing a secondary standard for ozone which was more stringent than the
primary standard, in recognition of the fact that "plants appear
to be more sensitive to ozone than humans." 51 In its proposal,
the agency offered two alternatives for the new secondary standard: a more stringent, seasonal standard, and a standard identi152
cal to the primary standard.
The bulk of EPA's discussion of the proposed standards for
ozone relates to the primary standard, and thus details the effects of ozone on human health. 53 In proposing a new secondary
standard, however, EPA also described recent studies of the effects of ozone on crops and natural resources, in controlled and
natural settings. Researchers have found that ozone levels consistent with the current secondary standard lead to substantial reductions in annual crop yields.1 54 EPA estimated that the proposed primary standard would improve crop yields so as to
produce between $490 million and $1.42 billion in annual benefits, and that a new secondary standard would produce annual
benefits ranging from $40 million to $580 million, depending on
the specific standard chosen. 155
EPA also analyzed the effects of ozone on natural resources,
particularly forests. The agency noted that "foliar injury is occur-

materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate"); see also National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone: Proposed Rule, 61
Fed. Reg. 65,716-17 (1996) [hereinafter Proposed Rule] (explaining
that primary standards protect people, secondary standards protect natural resources).
150. See Fischman, supra note 6, at 470-76.
151. Proposed Rule, supra note 149, at 65,735.
152. See id. at 65,742.
153. See id. at 65,723-26.

154. See id. at 65,736.
155. See id. at 65,741.
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ring on native vegetation in natural parks, forests, and wilderness
areas, and may be degrading the aesthetic quality of the natural
landscape ....
",156 Additionally, in western forests, particularly
the San Bernardino forest ecosystem, ozone has been associated
with a dramatic decline in the health of ponderosa and Jeffrey
pine, and with a concomitant decline in other organisms and
processes including fungal microflora and lichens.15 7 In eastern
forests, the agency predicted that low-level chronic ozone "is
more likely to produce subtle long-term forest responses such as
shifts in species composition, rather than wide-spread community
degradation." 158 At the same time, the agency admitted uncertainty as to whether ozone may be implicated in eastern forests'
decreased resistance to insect damage.15 9 As for natural resources
beyond forests, EPA noted that, "[b]y affecting crops and native
vegetation, [ozone] may also indirectly affect natural ecosystem
components such as soils, water, animals, and wildlife, although
such impacts are not quantifiable at this time." 160 The agency was
also unable to quantify even the impacts on the forests. In
describing the benefits that would flow from a new secondary air
quality standard for ozone, EPA noted that monetized benefits
for categories such as Class I areas and commercial forests could
not be estimated, although the proposed standards "would confer benefits . . . by reducing biomass loss, protecting functional,
aesthetic, and existence values, and by preserving biodiversity
161
and native habitat."

In its final decision on the secondary ozone standard, EPA did
not retract any of these statements about the effects of ozone on
crops, forests, and other natural resources. 162 Nevertheless, the
agency declined to set a new secondary ozone standard that was
more stringent than the primary standard. The agency
explained:

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 65,736.
See id. at 65,737.
Id. at 65,738.
See id.
Id. at 65,735.
Id. at 65,741.
See Final Rule, supra note 148, at 38,874-78.
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The decision not to set a seasonal secondary standard at this
time is based in large part on the Administrator's recognition
that the exposure, risk, and monetized valuation analyses
presented in the proposal contain substantial uncertainties, resulting in only rough estimates of the increased public welfare
protection likely to be afforded by each of the proposed alter163
native standards.

In short, the same pattern emerges in EPA's decision on the
ozone standard as was reflected in the asbestos ban: human
health effects were precisely and painstakingly quantified, and
did the bulk of the work in justifying regulation, while effects on
natural resources were left vague, unquantified, and looking like
a regulatory afterthought. 164 In the case of the ozone standard, as
with the asbestos ban, this vagueness about benefits to natural resources had an inhibitory effect on regulation, as it led EPA to
abandon its proposal to set a secondary standard different from
the primary standard.
The analytical burdens of any major rulemaking have become
enormous, 165 and at some point the costs of further analysis outweigh its benefits. 16 Indeed, in many cases the cost of requiring
more analysis will not simply be the cost of gathering more information; the cost will be the postponement or abandonment of
the regulatory effort itself. Not all facts can be known, now, even
if a great deal of money is spent to find them. Thus, my point is
not to condemn EPA's abbreviated analysis of the environmental
consequences of the asbestos ban or ozone standard. Rather, I
mean to suggest that if a quantification of risks, benefits, and
regulatory tradeoffs is required, and if this quantification serves
as the basis for judging the validity of regulation protecting natural resources, this will likely lead to less regulation protecting
natural resources, in one of two ways.

163. Id. at 38,877-78.
164. See also EPA, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to
1990, supra note 28, at 48-50 (report detailing benefits and costs of
Clean Air Act does not quantify ecological benefits beyond saying they
are "significant").
165. For general discussion, see Thomas 0. McGarity, Some
Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE L.J. 1385
(1992).
166. See Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra note 84, at 1553
("cost-benefit analysis may itself fail cost-benefit analysis, if the costs of
undertaking cost-benefit analysis are high and the benefits lower").
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First, where regulation simultaneously protects human health
and natural resources, it may be invalidated if an insufficient
proportion of the regulation's benefits is quantified. Thus, the
difficulties of measuring and valuing ecological risks may end up
curtailing even regulation designed to protect human health.
This is one possible interpretation of the history of the asbestos
ban.
Second, where regulation designed to protect human health is
inadequate to protect natural resources, and where the benefits
of enhanced regulation cannot be quantified due to the difficulties of measuring and valuing risks to natural resources, the enhanced regulation may fail if subject to an analytic requirement
which mandates quantification. This is the fate suffered by EPA's
proposed secondary standard for ozone (even in the absence of
such an analytic requirement).
In either case, requiring the quantification of risks, benefits,
and tradeoffs will lead to less regulation protecting natural resources, not because of the merits of the regulation, but because
the analytical requirement calls for quantification that is at present beyond our means.
CONCLUSION

The greatest perceived strength of the regulatory reforms I
have described is also their greatest weakness. Each of these reforms strives to make the regulatory system more rational
through a particular kind of decision making process, one characterized most of all by the quantification of risks and of the
benefits of reducing those risks. But reasoned quantification requires mature methods for estimating and valuing risks. We do
not now possess such methods for estimating and valuing risks to
natural resources, and indeed, respectful attention to the mysteries of ecology and the whims of the human soul may persuade
us that such methods will forever elude us.

